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ORDER FROM DISORDER: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE RUSSIAN SECURITIES MARKETS
J. ROBERT BROWN, JR.*

Last year was the year of expectations. This year is the
year of disappointment. Next year will be the year of
reckoning.'
1. INTRODUCTION

Vasiliev's words summed up the process of legal reform of
the Russian securities markets since the onset of privatization
in 1992. These words amounted to stark recognition that
effective and organized markets would emerge only when
participants were sufficiently ready for such advancement. In
many respects, this required a period of disorganization and

abuse, with the abuse itself fostering an environment of
reform.

The Russian securities markets were abuse ridden
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and disorganized. No central trading markets existed.
Participants operated in an environment devoid of useful
information. Managers and outside shareholders had an
antagonistic relationship, with constant conflict the norm.
Operating companies seeking to raise capital had to compete
with businesses running flamboyant television commercials
and promising 3,000% returns.
Views emanating from the west, particularly the United
States, suggested that the problems be corrected through legal
reform.' In other words, the problems resulted from an
inadequate legal infrastructure. With the possible exception
of crime,3 therefore, the absence of an adequate legal regime
amounted to the most common explanation for the economic
morass confronting Russia and for the dearth of much needed
foreign investment.4
Unquestionably, Russia had a flawed legal infrastructure.
The radical shift from a centrally planned economy to a
market economy necessitated a legal regime that would
account for the new dynamics.5 In many instances, laws were
2 The efforts at legal reform resurrect the debate between the law and
development movement in the United States and the efforts to export legal
norms to other countries. The United States had attempted to use legal
norms in an effort to "modernize" third world countries. These efforts were
criticized for not sufficiently taking into account the underlying sociological,
institutional and economic factors that existed in these countries, factors
that modified the effects of the legal regimes. See generally JAMES A.

GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN

LATIN AMERICA (1980); see also David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars
in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and
Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1062.
' See, e.g., Remarks by Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, U.S.
Ambassador to Russia: At the Four-Day Conference, Making Trade and
Investment Work: Financing,Kremlin Intl News Broadcast, Oct. 12, 1994,
availablein LEXIS, World Library ("Today, crime and corruption are major
impediments not only to foreign investment but to native Russian economic
enterprises as well.").
4 See id. (noting that economic problems were in part a result of "the
absence of legislation in many areas which are necessary to define an
effective and functional and orderly business relationship, the primary
example being that it's extremely difficult, if not impossible, under current
circumstances, to enforce contracts .

. . .").

In fairness, the calls were not

just for legal reform but also for increased enforcement.
'This article does not address the more fundamental question of whether
the "open market" model was appropriate. The case has been persuasively
made that countries in a developmental phase may opt for a model that
tolerates a much higher degree of government intervention. See CHALMERS
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss4/1
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hurriedly put into place without adequate thought or
analysis.'
The problems that developed, however, did not
arise from flaws in the legal regime but from the underlying
dynamics within the Russian markets.7
The development of the Russian securities markets
illustrated the limits of legal reform as a solution to the
country's economic problems. Through privatization, Russia
embarked on a deliberate effort to shift towards a market
economy. Most privatized companies were unprepared for
what followed. While the rules of management changed,
management itself did not. Privatized companies were
overseen by the same directors that had managed them during
the days of central planning. Neither the firms nor their
former management were equipped for the transition.
Predictably, management had a negative, if not hostile,
attitude towards outside (non-employee) shareholders. These
investors purchased shares with vouchers, obtaining an equity
interest without putting any capital into the companies. They
agitated for dividends and other forms of return, something
unpopular in cash-starved, often inefficient, companies still
coming to terms with the rigors of the private sector. The
relationship led to a variety of abuses in the corporate
governance area and battles for control between management
and the outside shareholders.
Ill equipped management was not the only problem.
Companies were expected to resort to public markets for their

A. JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC MIRACLE: THE GROWTH
OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY (1982).

'In the corporate area, the development of a model charter for privatized

companies is the best example. See MODEL CHARTER ON AN OPEN JOINT-

STOCK CO. (State Comm. of the Russian Fed'n for the Management of State
Property, 1992), translated in 2 PRIVATIZATION MANUAL doc. E-2, 1, 10
[hereinafter MODEL CHARTER].
The charter contained numerous
inconsistencies with the Statute on Joint-Stock Societies, SP RSFSR, Issue
No. 6, Item 92 (confirmed by Decree of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, No.
601) (Dec. 25, 1990) [hereinafter Regulation 601], the provision governing
corporations. See infra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
' This article does not maintain that legal reform is irrelevant or lacks
significance. In fact, in some areas, legal reform must continue. For
example, Russia lacks any law on intellectual property and needs a more
rational corporate tax system. The article, however, argues that many of
the obstacles that have hindered Russia's efforts to shift to a market
economy, particularly in the area of capital markets, do not lend themselves

to legal solutions.
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capital needs. They found, however, that the markets were
underdeveloped, disorganized, and not otherwise up to the
task.' Broker behavior was almost entirely unregulated, with
no requirements for reporting stock transactions, no
restrictions on the disclosure of mark-ups, and no general
principles of investor protection.
In addition, companies did not disclose meaningful
information about their operations. Little trading occurred on
an inter-regional basis, making national offerings difficult.
Public offerings, therefore, had to resort to loud television
commercials and promises of exorbitant returns to attract the
requisite purchasers, with MMM the most notable, but far
from only, example.'
Efforts arose to "correct" the abuses through legal reforms.
Presidential decrees addressed the improper use of the
shareholder registries and the problem of hyperbolic
advertisements. Large companies were required to include
outside directors on the Board. Agitation occurred for a
comprehensive revision of the existing corporate law.
The reforms rarely had their intended effect. This occurred
in part because of the inadequate consideration given to the
underlying dynamics of the Russian securities markets. Some
of these dynamics were bureaucratic. In the securities area,
for example, the Ministry of Finance, the primary agency
authorized to oversee the markets, had proved resolutely
unwilling to exercise effectively its authority. Simply giving
the Ministry additional power, therefore, did little to advance
the desired results.
Moreover, given Russia's history of central control,
adopting legal reforms designed to increase governmental
control of the markets meant greater intrusion into the
" Reliance on the capital markets was not the only potential solution.
Japan confronted equally dire straits following the Second World War.
Rather than turn to the equity markets, Japan used debt financing through
private banks as the primary mechanism for funding capital needs. This
approach succeeded in minimizing foreign ownership and in increasing
government control over the development process. See J. ROBERT BROWN,
JR., OPENING JAPAN'S FINANCIAL MARKETS (1994).
' The demise of MMM in July 1994 affected an estimated 5 million
shareholders. In a two-week period, shares of MMM were worth less than
one percent of their pre-collapse price. See Stock Fund Collapses in Panic,
Facts on File World News Digest, Aug. 4, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library.
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markets, a cure worse than the ailment.
Government
bureaucracies took advantage of their regulatory authority to
exact concessions and further expand their power. The
Russian people, in turn, learned to look to the government for
solutions to economic problems. The government's inclination
to intervene in economic matters, coupled with popular
support for such intervention, created a direct threat to the
emerging securities markets.
Legal reforms also occurred during a time when adequate
supporting institutions did not exist. The country lacked a
transparent and efficient market for shares. So long as
managements' actions did not affect share prices, no market
dynamic existed for penalizing companies that failed to
observe the rights and best interests of shareholders. Without
this market mechanism, companies often engaged in technical
compliance with legal requirements, but left the underlying
concerns unaddressed.
In many respects, the status of and problems in Russian
securities markets represented a normal phase of development.
A company's need for capital and the need for business by
brokers caused additional evolution in the market. Trading
would, over time, become more transparent, with brokers
providing information on price and companies disclosing
adequate financial information and displaying less hostility
towards outside shareholders.
The problem was that Russia lacked the time needed for
gradual evolution. With bank loans unavailable and foreign
investment at anemic levels, the capital markets increasingly
represented the only source of financing for cash starved
companies. Without more organized markets, this would
remain difficult, if not impossible, and would threaten the
country's economic recovery.
Facilitating the development of capital markets required
less emphasis on legal reform and greater focus on improving
the dynamics necessary for organized markets. Participants
in the market had to appreciate the differentiation among
brokers and companies before any standards would become
meaningful. Before this could happen, Russia would be forced
to face Vasiliev's day of reckoning.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.

[Vol. 15:4

2. PRIVATIZATION
Many of the problems in the development of the securities
markets arose as a direct consequence of the privatization
process. Privatization in Russia amounted to an extraordinary
transfer of property rights from the public to the private
sector. By the end of the first phase of privatization ("voucher
privatization") in June 1994, seventy percent of governmentowned enterprises had been transferred to private ownership,
a remarkable achievement in only two years.'" The process
was a rude shock to Russian industry. Few companies were
prepared for the inevitable consequences of private ownership.
In addition, governmental policies did not focus on postprivatization matters; the immediate goal was to get
ownership out of the hands of the government as soon as
possible.
Privatization occurred through a system of voucher
auctions. Russian citizens received a privatization check or a
voucher with a face value of 10,000 rubles or, at the time,
about twenty-five dollars.1 The vouchers could then be used
at auctions to bid for shares of privatized companies. The first
voucher privatization took place in Nizhny Novgorod in
1992.12
An auction involved the sale of only a minority of a
company's outstanding shares. In recognition of the prevailing
political realities, the privatization program contemplated the
purchase of large, even controlling, blocks of shares by
employees. Although ownership was now decentralized, both
management and employees retained the ability to protect
their own interests.
To become privatized, a company would select one of three
plans of distribution. The first provided workers with the
" Voucher privatization continued, albeit in a reduced form, after June
30, 1994. The Mayor of Moscow announced that vouchers would continue
to be accepted for privatized industries in the city. In addition, the
government authorized the use of vouchers by employees when their
company went private.
" Each Russian national could obtain the voucher from a local office of
Sberbank, the national savings bank. In total, approximately 150 million
vouchers were distributed. High Stakes on the High Steppe, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 16, 1993, at 89.
1" Privatization took place even earlier in Vladivostok.
The sales,
however, were for cash rather than for vouchers.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss4/1

1994]

RUSSIAN SECURITIES MARKETS

option of acquiring twenty-five percent of the company's
nonvoting shares while the management received five percent
of the voting shares at a nominal cost.'" The second option
permitted managers and workers to use either cash or
vouchers to buy fifty-one percent of the company's voting
shares, at a price equal to 1.7 times the July 1992 book

value."

Managers and employees could obtain an additional

five percent through a vehicle resembling an employee stock
ownership plan. Finally, as a third option, managers were
allowed to buy forty percent of the company's outstanding

voting shares. Management, however, had to offer assurances
that the company would not cease operations.
Most companies chose the second option." This placed
approximately sixty percent of the outstanding voting shares
in the hands of management and employees.' 6 Typically, an
additional twenty-nine percent of the shares were sold at
voucher auctions. Additionally, local property funds received
shares as compensation for the costs associated with
auctions.' 7 The interests allowed property funds to maintain
influence over privatized companies. Through mid-1994,
therefore, property funds continued to own large blocks of
privatized companies' shares.' s
"3Workers and managers could purchase an additional 10% of the shares
at relatively little cost. These shares were placed in something resembling
an employee stock ownership plan ("ESOP").
14 For an explanation of the calculation of book values of state operated
corporations see, Maxim Boycko, et al., Privatizing Russia, 24-25 (August
1993) (paper prepared for the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, Sept.
9-10, 1993) [hereinafter Boycko].
"'Some companies with high nominal share values, often those involving
capital intensive industries, chose the first option. Few selected the third.
See id. at 21 (noting that, by July 1, 1993, 77.8% of the companies had
selected option 2; 21% selected option 1); see also International Finance
Corporation & U.K. Know How Fund, Russia: The Legal and Regulatory
Framework for Equity Investment, The Framework for Mass Privatization
Annex 2, p. 2 (May 25, 1994) (draft discussion paper, on file with
International Finance Corporation, Washington, D.C.) (noting that 75% of
the companies selected the second option).
1 See Boycko, supra note 14 (table 1).
17 Property funds received preference shares that paid a fixed annual
dividend of five percent of an enterprise's net profits. When sold, the shares
automatically converted to ordinary shares.
" The shares owned by the property funds allowed the government to
have continued influence over company policies. One incentive to encourage
the sale of these interests was the prohibition against public offerings for
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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The privatization process stimulated the development of
the first free securities market in Russia. A liquid market for
vouchers arose contemporaneously with the onset of
privatization."9 With nearly thirty percent of a company's
stock typically sold at voucher auctions, discernible groups had
considerable interests in acquiring these shares. Management,
for example, wanted to prevent the shares from falling into
the hands of unruly outside investors. Conversely, outside
investors wanted the shares to gain control and displace
management. Both groups, therefore, had an interest in
accumulating vouchers. At the same time, individual Russians
had an incentive to sell vouchers and receive an immediate
return, particularly given the early uncertainty surrounding
the viability of privatization. As a result, a market in
vouchers quickly developed.
The voucher system had a significant effect on the
securities markets. First, it contributed to the development of
classes of market intermediaries, such as brokers. For
brokers, vouchers represented an early and critical source of
business, something that would eventually evolve into the
trading of equity securities of privatized companies.
The voucher system also seemed destined to result in
atomistic ownership patterns with large numbers of
shareholders acquiring small amounts of shares. They would
not, therefore, be able to influence management.
The
environment fostered the development of voucher funds. The
funds accumulated vouchers from individual investors and
used them to purchase large blocks of shares in privatized
companies. The voucher funds represented Russia's first class
of institutional investors.
The use of an auction to distribute vouchers also
stimulated the development of a secondary market. The

companies in which the local property funds owned 10% or more of the
shares. See infra note 105.
19 The market was also highly sensitive to material information about
the privatization process. The price of vouchers collapsed in the early
summer of 1994 as the voucher program ended. In early June, however, the
Russian government announced a list of companies to be privatized,
described by Anatoly Chubais as "the biggest jewels in the privatization
crown." Julie Tolkacheva, As July 1 Nears, Voucher Prices Soar, MOSCOW
TIMES, June 10, 1994, at 11. The market immediately reacted to the
information, as voucher prices increased overnight by 10,000 rubles. See id.
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auction process resulted in an artificial configuration of share
ownership, with many individuals owning a small number of
a company's shares."0 In the post-privatization era, this
configuration would need to be altered, a situation that would
encourage secondary trading activity. With the rush to
privatize, however, little thought was given to how the
secondary markets would develop.
Privatization, therefore, resulted in the creation of a
number of institutions and intermediaries necessary for the
development of the securities markets. Moreover, by widely
distributing shares, privatization resulted in a nation of
investors, many of whom would want to be active in the
securities markets.
At the same time, however, little was done to encourage
companies to reorient themselves away from Soviet-style
management. Resistant to change and the new economic
realities, management had little interest in appealing to
outside investors. In general, therefore, companies did not
disclose meaningful financial information and opposed free
floating shares which could fall into the hands of outside
investors seeking to obtain control.
3. THE POST-PRIVATIZATION ENVIRONMENT

3.1. In General
The maelstrom of privatization meant that companies
were suddenly forced to deal with the reality of outside
investors. Managers and employees tended to own the largest
percentage of shares. For these groups, profits were a
secondary concern, outweighed by the goal of preserving jobs.
Non-management employees wanted to avoid joining the
burgeoning ranks of the unemployed, while managers wished
to retain control over their corporate fiefdoms. The attitudes
differed little from those that prevailed in the pre-privatization
era.
Outside investors, however, had other interests. They were

" Privatization produced 40 million share holders. See Press Luncheon
With the Chairman of Goskominushchestvo Anatoly Chubais, Kremlin Int'l
News Broadcast, Sept. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library
[hereinafter Press Luncheon].
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motivated not by the preservation of jobs, but rather by the
desire to maximize returns.
The rise of voucher funds
intensified these divisions. The funds often promised high
returns to individuals to induce them to contribute their
vouchers. They therefore pressured management to pay
dividends. Where management proved unaccommodating, the
funds sometimes attempted to seize control and displace
existing management.
The views of these two groups were antithetical. Both
management and large outside investors focused on obtaining
control, with the ultimate desire of ousting the other from the
company.2" Since employees often owned the largest number
of shares, management sought to control the their votes.2" It
accomplished this by using devices such as "trust"
arrangements and proxies, which gave management the right
to vote the employee shares for an extended period (e.g., fiveyears). 3
The best method for ensuring control, however, was actual
ownership of the shares. Management could buy the shares at
auctions, which meant accumulating vouchers. Alternatively,
management could purchase the shares for cash in the

"1In other instances, the removal of the "old guard" was accompanied by
economic upheaval. For example, both Germany and Japan witnessed
purges of their corporate elite following World War II. Whatever the merits
of penalizing these individuals for the conflict, the practice essentially made
room for a younger, perhaps more adaptable, group of managers. This,
however, has not occurred in Russia.
" The use of coercion to control the votes of employees also found
application in the voucher market. Some companies required employees to
transfer their vouchers to management, perhaps at a nominal price. Even
in the absence of such overt measures, management had other mechanisms
for controlling the votes of employees. Russian law did not provide for
confidential voting by shareholders. This allowed management to know how
each of its employees had voted. Employees who voted against management
risked losing their jobs, a real concern given the growing rate of
unemployment.
" The ability to accumulate and control shares held by employees in the
short-term meant that management was relatively entrenched. As aresult,
little opportunity existed to displace the Soviet-style directors who remained
from the days of central control. Leverage over employees, however, was at
best a temporary solution. The shares distributed to employees were
generally not placed in an aggregating vehicle such as an ESOP, but were
owned individually. As a result, many employees sold their shares. Unless
purchased by management, the sold shares ceased to be guaranteed votes
for management.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss4/1
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"secondary" market. To do this, managers hired brokers to
solicit the shares, a task greatly facilitated by management's
control of the share registry. This represented a form of
vertical integration, with the brokers often becoming directly
identified with the company.24
Management went to great lengths to discourage and
disenfranchise outside investors. The tactics ranged from the
blunt-barring them from attending shareholder meetings,
refusing to reflect transfers on the share registry-to the more
subtle-organizing management-owned voucher funds and
investor groups to ensure control over shares sold to the
public.
Despite the seemingly chaotic nature of these activities, the
battles took place within a surprisingly rich legal regime.
Russia had both an extensive corporate code, and specialized
regulatory provisions governing voucher funds, brokers,
exchanges and stock offerings. The relatively full framework
notwithstanding, early efforts to "fix" the problems between
management and outside shareholders focused on enhancing
the legal framework.
3.2. The Joint-Stock Company Law
The first step for every medium and large enterprise
undergoing privatization was to reorganize as a joint-stock
company.25 Established in 1990,2" the provisions governing
the corporate form were adopted as regulations, with the
Soviet government presumably anticipating a more permanent
replacement.
Regulation 601 contained a curious
amalgamation of concepts, some seemingly borrowed from
other industrial countries 7 and others more attuned to the
24

Other methods of retaining control included the use of captive voucher
funds. This approach had to address ownership limitations imposed on
voucher funds, which could be circumvented by using more than one fund.
25 Companies with a book value of not less than fifty million rubles on
January 1, 1992 had to reorganize as open joint-stock companies. Those
with values between one and fifty million rubles could convert into jointstock companies and participate in the voucher auctions if such action was
requested by the employees and approved by the local property committee.
See George G. Angelov, Legal FrameworkofPrivatizationin Russia, 2 MINN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 207, 207-08 (1993).
Regulation 601, supra note 6, Item 92.
27
For example, the regulations permit a dual board structure resembling
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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particular needs of Russian enterprises.2 '
Essentially,
however, the regulations provided for a conventional corporate
form with ownership evidenced by registered shares. 9
Additionally, a model charter adopted by presidential decree
included further guidance in the corporate governance area."0
A number of commentators have already sketched out the
broad contours of Regulation 601, "' something that need not
be repeated here. The regulation contained a number of
provisions that made ordinary corporate governance more
difficult and facilitated abuse by management.3 2
For
example, the regulation required that a quorum of
shareholders be present for a company to conduct business at
a shareholders' meeting, a conventional enough requirement.
The requirement did not apply, however, to meetings
rescheduled because of the lack of a quorum. Companies,

the system of governance in Germany.
8 For example, this regulation required all joint-stock companies to
create an audit commission, elected by and from shareholders. The
commission had the authority to review financial statements and call
extraordinary meetings. See Regulation 601, supra note 6, arts. 130-35.
29 See id. art. 54. The regulation did not provide for bearer shares. To
the extent that companies attempted to circumvent the requirement, see
infra notes 128-30, they did so by issuing bearer instruments that could be
converted into shares. The law permitted the formation of "open" or
"closed"joint-stock companies. The principal distinction was that shares of
a closed joint-stock company could only be transferred with the consent of
shareholders, unless otherwise specified in the charter. See Regulation 601,
supra note 6, art. 7. Closed companies also had lower minimum capital
requirements, although inflation made the distinctions between open
(100,000 rubles) and closed (10,000 rubles) inconsequential.
*3See MODEL CHARTER supra note 6. Although the charter increased
shareholder protection, it was flawed in that, even if adopted, it could be
amended at a shareholder meeting. In some circumstances, companies
amended their charter before the voucher auction, inserting provisions
designed to minimize the role of outside investors. Amendments included
provisions that required directors to be employees of the company or that
classified the charter and information about insider holdings as "secrets."
" See, e.g., Angelov, supra note 25; Olga Floroff & Susan Tiefenbrun, A
Legal Frameworkfor Soviet Privatization,18 PEPP. L. REV. 849 (1991); see
also William G. Frenkel & Michael Y. Sukhman, New Foreign Investment
Regimes of Russia and Other Republics of the FormerU.S.S.R: A Legislative
Analysis and Historical Perspective, 16 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 321
(1993).

" This statement is hesitantly made. No corporate code could have been
drafted that would have eliminated all opportunities for abuse.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss4/1
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therefore, would schedule a shareholder meeting, cancel it due
to the absence of a quorum, and then hold the rescheduled
meeting immediately thereafter, sometimes within minutes of
cancellation. In addition to allowing decisions to be made in
the absence of a majority, this process also reduced the
incentive to fully canvass and notify shareholders of an
upcoming meeting. 3s
Moreover, Regulation 601 allowed shareholders to vote
either in person or by power of attorney. The power of
attorney, however, had to be notarized, an expensive process
in Russia. Companies would therefore agree to pay the costs
of notarization in return for an employee's pledge to vote in a
manner acceptable to management. Employees who took part
in this process would often designate management's agent to
vote the shares. In some instances, the power of attorney had
a duration as long as five years.34
A number of provisions also made any change in
management more difficult, further insulating former statesupported directors from the possibility of removal. Directors
could not be removed before the expiration of their terms. 5
The use of two year terms exacerbated the problem.3"
Similarly, the general director had considerable autonomy.3 7
"' The failure to notify all shareholders had a disproportionate impact on
outside investors. Employees, the shareholders most likely to support
management, could be and typically were notified in advance by notices
posted in the workplace. Reaching outside investors required the use of
certified mail, a requirement that made the process more expensive.
Because of the cost and uncertainty of their support, management was least
likely to encourage these outside investors to attend the meeting.
"' The regulation also contained additional cumbersome provisions
which, given circumstances in Russia, protected shareholder interests.
Shareholders had to approve an increase in share capital before any offering
could occur, although only by a "simple majority vote." Regulation 601,
supra note 6, art. 39. Because company law largely did not permit the use
of authorized but unissued shares, shareholders had to approve any new
issue of shares. While this could delay the public offering process, it also
limited management's ability to issue additional shares and dilute the
interests of existing shareholders.
" Id. art. 113. In addition, some companies inserted provisions into
their charters extending the terms of directors to as long as five years.
36 Id. art. 39. Of course, not all of the provisions were stacked in favor
of management. See id. (Stating that management could not issue
additional shares without first obtaining shareholder approval.).
3
Regulation 601 provided that the general director "shall have the right
without a power of attorney to effectuate actions in the name of the society."
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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The equivalent of a company's CEO, the general director was
elected directly by shareholders.3" Once elected, therefore,
neither the shareholders nor the board had effective means of
controlling the general director for the remainder of the
term."9
In the immediate post-privatization era, management took
advantage of these "gaps" in the regulatory framework to
maintain control over companies. This, however, was less a
reflection of flawed draftsmanship or inadequate legal regimes
and more a recognition of management's willingness to use any
device - legitimate or illegitimate - to preserve its position.

With no market penalty for this approach and with dire
consequences for complacency, management's attitude was
inevitable.
3.3. ShareholderGovernance
The problems between management and outside investors
defied legal solutions. A series of laws and presidential
decrees attempted to eliminate the most pronounced abuses,
with little success.
The first significant attempts at regulatory reform focused
on reducing management's ability to manipulate share
registries, an area largely unregulated by Regulation 601.
Regulation 601 provided only that companies had to maintain
a register of shareholders.4" Most companies controlled their
own registers, although sometimes contracting out the
responsibility to a broker.4
Id. art. 128. The general director also kept the minutes of the board
meetings. Id. art. 129.
8 Article 6.3(13) of the model charter provides that shareholders have
"exclusive competence" over the appointment of the general director. MODEL
CHARTER, supra note 6, at § IV art. 6.3(13). Article 7.1 states thiat the
Chairman of the Board "shall be" the general director. Id. art. 7.1.
Regulation 601 merely provides that the meeting of shareholders should
select the general director from "among the directors." Regulation 601,
supra note 6, art 124.
"' As a member of the board, the general director also had two votes.
MODEL CHARTER, supra note 6, art. 8.1. Moreover, the shareholders power
to remove directors prior to expiration of their terms included the general
director.
40 Regulation 601, supra note 6, art. 50.
41 By presidential decree, companies with more than 1000 shareholders
were required to use an independent registrar. The decree did not, however,
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss4/1
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Companies used registers to control shareholder behavior.
Russia had nothing resembling a system of ownership
disclosure. Large shareholders had no obligation to disclose
their interests after crossing significant ownership
thresholds.4'2 This meant that large, sometimes controlling,
blocks of stock could be acquired secretly. Companies
responded to these activities 43by refusing to recognize the
transfers on the share registry.

The problem of share registries drew a concerted response
from the Russian government. A presidential decree issued in
October of 1993 required that large companies use an
independent registrar." In April 1994, the GKI and the
Russian Federation Commission on Securities and Exchanges
("RFCSE") jointly issued regulations governing company
registers. 5 The provisions specified the requirements for a
shareholder register, the procedures for maintaining it, the
define independent. See Vedomosti RSFSR, No. 2284 (1993) [hereinafter
1993 Privatization Decree] (on file with the Journal).
42 In the United States, for example, shareholders acquiring more than
five percent of a class of equity securities of a public company must disclose
that interest and their intent in a Schedule 13D. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2
(1991). Purchasers of 15% of the shares of joint-stock companies in Russia
must file with the Ministry of Finance. See The Regulations for the Issue
and Circulation of Securities and for Stock Exchanges in the RSFSR,
Vedomosti RSFSR, Issue 78, Item No. 7-8, § 5, art. 49 (1991) [hereinafter SP
RSFSR No. 78]. Those acquiring more than 35% of a company or where the
shares represented more than 50% of the total voting shares, are required
to seek permission prior to purchase of the RSFSR State Committee for
Price and Support for New Economic Structures. See Regulation 601, supra
note 6, art. 147; see also SP RSFSR No. 78, supra, art. 50 . In addition,
foreign investors investing more than 100 million rubles generally had to
receive approval from the Russian Agency for International Cooperation and
Development. These filings, however, were with the government and were
not public.
41 See Press Luncheon, supra note 20 ("We know that today more often
than not the register is a secret boom which the director keeps in his safe
and will not show anyone even under the threat of death."). The attempts
to use the share registry were not limited to controlling blocks. Some
companies had in their charters limits on total ownership and refused to
register trades that exceeded that amount. This proved to be a particularly
thorny problem for shares in nominee accounts.
44 The decree did not define "independent." As a practical matter,
companies often fulfilled the requirementby transferring responsibilities for
maintaining the register to a broker.
4' REGULATION ON A JOINT-STOCK CO. SHAREHOLDER REGISTER Protocol
No. 2 art. 18.04 (Commission on Securities and Exchanges of the President
of the Russian Federation, 1994) (on file with the Journal).
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contents of a shareholder extract and the duties of the person
maintaining the registry.46
Registries were not the only focus of reform efforts. The
1994 Privatization Decree also contained a number of
provisions that addressed the issue of shareholders' rights.4'
These included provisions requiring equal treatment of
shareholders," annual meetings of shareholders within 120
days of the end of the calendar year,49 a distribution of
materials relevant to shareholders, 0 the approval of seventyfive percent of the outstanding shares at the meeting for52
certain actions,5 ' limitations on the issuance of shares,
cumulative voting,53 a board with independent directors, 4
and a prohibition against companies voting their unissued
shares.55 The provisions also granted to the RFCSE the
"' The regulations also addressed the issues of nominee ownership. They
recognized the status of a "share possessor," a person "who holds shares in
his own name on behalf of another person ...

without being the owner of

the shares." Id. art. 6.1. The rules imposed some basic obligations but
otherwise specified that the share possessor would have whatever rights
were provided by contract with the owner of the shares. I& art. 6.2.
""See 1993 Privatization Decree, supra note 41.
48 Id. art. 9.10.1 (stating "all common shares of an open joint-stock
company shall entitle their holders to equal rights and shall pay equal
dividends,
regardless of their date of issue").
49
Id. In addition, the provision required the board to approve financial
statements within 60 days after the end of the fiscal year. Failure to do so
would result in the delivery of the balance sheet to the tax inspector's office,
which would then perform an audit at the company's expense. The
provision was presumably designed to ensure that the company had
prepared financial statements sufficiently in advance of the meeting of
shareholders. See id.
" No later than 30 days before the meeting, shareholders were to be sent
written notice of the meeting, an agenda approved by the board, and
information on agenda issues, including a ballot. Id. art. 9.10.7.
"' Id. art. 9.10.2. The requirement applied to: amendments to the
charter, changes in charter capital, the disposition of substantial portions
of the company's assets (defined as an amount exceeding 25%of the charter
capital), participation in holding companies, association of enterprises and
financial industrial groups, and reorganizations or liquidations of the
company. Id.
5r2I.

art. 9.10.3.

53 Id. art. 9.10.4.
14 The provision does not specifically require independent directors.
Rather, no more than one-third of the directors may be employees of the
company. I&
6 Id. art. 9.10.5. This apparently was designed to prevent the company
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss4/1

1994]

RUSSIAN SECURITIES MARKETS

authority to develop regulations concerning the "procedure for
preparing and conducting the general meeting of open stock
companies.""
None of these reforms had a discernible impact." Some
companies began to utilize "independent" registrars, as
required by the presidential decree. With no definition of
"independent" in the decree, and no market mechanism to
ensure compliance with its spirit, companies often conformed

to the technical, but not to the intent, of the requirement."8
The register would typically be given to a broker that worked
closely with the company. Other companies established their
own "pocket" registrars, entities that were created to appear

independent, but which in reality were under the control of the
company.
matters."

If anything, the reform attempts

worsened

3.4. Assessment
Although flaws in the legal system may have accentuated
some abuses, these laws represented only a small part of the
overall problem." The problems arose primarily from market
dynamics that resulted from the method of privatization. No

from voting shares that had not yet been sold or that had been repurchased.
The shares also could not be counted for purposes of determining quorum.
Id.

56

Id. art. 9.10.7.
5 Six months after Yeltsin's decree on registries, Anatoly Chubais
described it as the "main problem" in connection with "the creation of the
securities market." Press Luncheon, supra note 20.
58 See REGULATION ON A JOINT-STOCK CO. SHAREHOLDER REGISTER supra
note 45, art. 5.2 (requiring that the "holders of a share register ... be ...

legal persons which are not shareholders of the Joint Stock Company
concerned with or exercising control over its shares").
6, Brokers could monitor trades, providing added sources of business.
They could also refuse to register trades. In at least one instance, a
company holding shares in nominee name was refused the right to register.
Stories circulating in Moscow indicated that in other instances, brokers or
other registrars would charge high fees, sometimes a percentage of the value
of the transaction, before registering the transaction.
60 Some still ascribe the disorganized securities markets to a lack of
sufficient legal infrastructure. See, e.g. Elif Kaban, No Regulation, No
Security in Russian Securities, THE Moscow TIMES, July 6, 1994, at 12

("The government, too busy trying to keep Russia together, has delayed the
introduction for nearly two years of a crucial securities law which would
ensure transparency and liquidity.").
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amount of legal change could have prevented these abuses and
problems."1 They would cease only when companies and
outside investors learned that their disparate views were
reconcilable."2
The early attempts at shareholder protection through
changes in the legal regime, particularly those concentrating
on registers and shareholder rights, had little impact. Nor did
they seem to accelerate the replacement of former Soviet-style
directors.6" Nonetheless, it would be wrong to say that these
efforts were wasted. In line with Vasiliev's assessment, as the
markets continued to evolve, reforms would become more
relevant.
To the extent that market dynamics would affect the
behavior of management, the development of large
institutional investors seemed destined to play a pronounced
role. Voucher funds acted as aggregating entities, accepting
small numbers of vouchers from large numbers of investors
and using them to buy large blocks of shares in privatized
companies. They therefore seemed to be in a position to act as
a check on management. Market dynamics, however, dictated
a different outcome.

81

For example, the Ministry of Finance required companies engaging in
a public offering to include audited financial statements in the prospectus.
See infra text accompanying notes 112-116. Companies, though, would sell
shares in a newly formed shell company, thereby avoiding any meaningful
financial disclosure. See infra text accompanying notes 124-25.
2 Despite the unique transformation taking place in Russia, this pattern
of behavior has an almost universal quality. Managers want to preserve
their jobs. Investors want to maximize returns on investment. To many,
these seem to be antithetical goals. Both, therefore, saw their particular
goal as paramount and both exploited gaps in the law or weaknesses in the
legal system to strengthen their position and vanquish their opponent. This
type of dynamic exploitation of legal regimes has occurred in the United
States in connection with the regulations governing takeovers. See J.
Robert Brown, Jr., Regulatory Intervention in the Market for Corporate
Control, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1990).
6 See Press Luncheon, supra note 20 ("This is the most important
problem today. If you talk to any serious foreign investor considering the
problem of whether or not to invest in a specific enterprise, the first and
most important thing is the personality of the head.").
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4. THE ROLE OF MARKET INTERMEDIARIES

With the distribution of vouchers and the sale of company
shares, the market had a significant need for intermediaries.
In the aftermath of privatization, two developed immediately:
brokers and voucher funds. Both played important roles in the
early development of the market. Their functions, however,
were not in line with conventional western notions, but rather
were shaped by the unique conditions of the Russian markets.
Since a traditional secondary market did not exist, the
primary function of brokers was not to bring together buyers
and sellers for the purpose of reselling shares, but rather to
act as an agent for those trying to accumulate blocks, often
controlling blocks, of shares in companies. Voucher funds
represented the first significant institutional investor in
Russia. Subject to the jurisdiction of the State Committee of
the Russian Federation for the Management of State Property
(Goskomimushchestvo or, more commonly, GKI) e , and,
eventually, the RFCSE, the funds issued shares primarily to
individuals in return for vouchers.6 5 They often attracted
investors through promises of exorbitant returns, thus placing
pressure on funds to show quick and bountiful profits. In
many instances, this meant obtaining control of the companies
and displacing the existing management.
As with other areas in the corporate realm, the voucher
funds were subjected to a basic regulatory framework. The
provisions distinguished between ordinary investment funds"6

64

SP RSFSR, Issue

No. 1186, § 4(a) (1992) translated in

PRIVATIZATION MANUAL Doc. H-i, at 1 (1992) [hereinafter

2 THE

SP RSFSR No.

1186]. Ordinary investment funds were subject to the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Finance. Id. § 4(b). As with joint-stock companies, a
presidential decree set forth a model charter for investment funds. Id.
(Supp. 3 1992).
Is According to estimates, the voucher funds in the aggregate had, by
April 31, 1994, accumulated in excess of 45 million vouchers. The funds also
had a total of approximately 20.69 million shareholders. The size of the
funds created immediate logistical problems. As aggregating entities, funds
had large numbers of shareholders that had contributed a small number of
vouchers. As with joint-stock companies, funds were required to hold
annual meetings of shareholders. See Russia: Battle for the Boardrooms,
Euromoney, July 19, 1994 (noting that 44% of all vouchers issued in
privatization were held by voucher funds).
66 SP RSFSR. 1186, supra note 64, Supp. No. 1 § 4.
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and voucher funds."' The distinction was more than mere
semantics. Voucher funds remained subject to the jurisdiction
of GKI, while ordinary, investment funds remained subject to
the Ministry of Finance. 8
The regulatory system required the licensing of all voucher
funds." The largest fund registered directly with the GKI,
while the smaller funds did so with local property management
committees."0 The ability to revoke a license provided GKI
with some leverage, although as a practical matter it rarely
proved a credible threat."'
In many respects, the structure of the funds was not
unique. The law contemplated the use of a manager, with the
67 Id. Article Nine of the decree provided that GKI would adopt
regulations concerning the suspension of funds, the regulation of share
offerings, the licensing of managers and the regulation of the procedures
governing the exchange of shares between property funds and voucher
funds. These regulations were issued a month later. See Typical
Regulations on Licensing of the Activity of Special Investment Funds for
Privatization Intended to Accumulate Citizens' Vouchers, of Managers of
these Funds, and on the Suspension and Revocation of Licenses' Approved
by Order of the State Committee of the Russian Federation for the
Management of State Property, No. 695-R Nov. 4 1992, reprinted in 2 THE
PRIVATIZATION MANUAL, Doe. H-4 at 1 [hereinafter TYPICAL REGULATIONS].
6" Indeed, the law preserved the division among bureaucracies by
eliminating overlap in a number of specific situations. Banks and insurance
companies as well as other institutions were regulated by the Ministry of
Finance and the Central Bank, and those operated as voucher funds were
excluded from the Voucher Fund Law. See SP RSFSR No. 1186, supra note
64, § 3 (Supp. 1 1992). This meant that there would be no overlapping
jurisdiction between these bureaucracies and the GKI. See id.
", See id. § 21 (establishing a licensing requirement). To obtain the
license, the funds had to provide copies of their charter, an application
(which identified all officers, directors, the manager, depository, affiliates,
and the independent auditor), a prospectus describing the issue, a copy of
the management and depository agreements and a copy of the manager's
license. Id. § 22.
" Newly established funds with capital of 50 million or more rubles,
open joint-stock companies licensed as funds with capital of 1 billion or more
rubles, and funds set up with the participation of foreign capital had to
register with GKI. Fund managers also had to register with GKI. TYPICAL
REGULATIONS, supra note 67, Doc. H-5, 1-2. Smaller funds were to register
with the "territorial committees for the management of state property." Id.
7, Among other things, the regulations permitted license revocation or
suspension for false or misleading statements made during the application
process, for the refusal to provide the licensing body with requested
information and for engaging in transactions prohibited by law. Id. Upon
suspension, the fund had 30 days to correct the deficiencies and receive
reinstatement. Id.
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manager's contractual agreement subject to shareholder
approval.'
It also recognized the need for certain basic
protections, including the requirement that a majority of the
fund's board consist of independent directors7" and the
imposition of restrictions on related party transactions.7 4
The provisions also imposed a number of substantive
restrictions. Funds could not accumulate more than ten
percent of the voting shares of any company (later elevated to
twenty-five percent),"5 or place more than five percent of
their net assets into the securities of a single issuer.' The
provisions also provided that the funds could not invest in
securities issued by their manager, depository or independent
auditor, or any shareholder owning five percent or more of the
fund's shares. 7 Nor could funds engage in pyramid schemes;
investments in other funds were expressly prohibited. 8
Finally, the law contained specific disclosure obligations.
It required quarterly and annual reports, including a balance
sheet and a statement of the fund's net asset value.
The
materials had to be certified by the independent auditor80
and made "available" to shareholders within thirty days after
the end of each quarter and sixty days after the end of the
fiscal year."'
2

See SP RSFSR No. 1186, supra note 64, Supp. No. 1 § 24. The United
States has a similar system in place under the Investment Company Act of
1940.
"' Here, independent meant not being the manager, the independent
auditor, or its affiliates. Id. Supp. No. 1 § 18.
"' Id. Supp. No. 1 § 30. Specifically, the provision required board
approval of certain contracts between insiders (manager, officers and
directors of the fund) and companies in which the fund had invested, and
between the fund and another entity in which an insider had a financial
interest.
71 The percentage was increased in the 1993 privatization decree. See
1993 Privatization Decree, supra note 47; see also Elisabeth Rubinfien &
Janet Guyon, Savvy Young Men Russia's Alfa Fund Makes Waves, Profit in
Voucher Investment, WALL ST. J. EUR. July 12, 1994, at 1, 12.
716See SP RSFSR No. 1186, supra note 64, § 20 (Supp 1, 1992).
77
Icd
78 Id.
7

1d. § 37.

g Id
81
1d. The funds also had to make available within 60 days after the end
of the fiscal year, free of charge, information on all contracts and
transactions entered into by the fund and all payments made between the
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As privatization continued, the number of funds greatly
increased. s2 By May 1994, 659 funds existed, of with 121
registered with GKI and 538 listed with the local property
committees.8" Despite the large numbers, however, most
were small and unlikely to survive in a post-privatization,
post-voucher era."
In some respects, the voucher funds represented a counterweight to management. The funds could accumulate large
blocks of shares in privatized companies.85 With Russian
companies dominated by soviet style directors, who often
controlled substantial blocks of stock, voucher funds emerged
as potential guardians of the interests of outside investors.8 6
The funds, therefore, were often vocal critics of
management's practices, including its treatment of
shareholders. Yet from the very beginning, they themselves
manager (and affiliates) and any entity in which the voucher fund was, at
the time, an investor. Id. § 38.
8 The largest voucher funds as of April 1994 in terms of vouchers were:
First Voucher Fund; Alfa-Kapital; Neftalmazinvest; MMM Invest; and
Moskovskaya Nedvizhimost. First Voucher, for example, has 4.5 million
shareholders. See Euan Craik, Voucher Funds Lost in Sell-Off Shuffle, THE
Moscow TIMES, Oct. 26, 1994.
8 These numbers do not, of course, include unregistered funds. Moscow
had the largest number of registered funds, 140, with another 24 in the
Moscow Oblast. St. Petersburg, the location with the second largest number
of funds, had only 41, none of which were registered with GKI. The number
of licensed funds showed a steady increase, growing to 650 as of May 31,
1994. See Voucher Investors Face Lean imes, Moscow TIMES, May 31,
1994 at 15.
84 According to a study of 90 voucher funds by the State Property
Committee, 12 had assets of under one million rubles (approximately $525).
See Julie Tolkacheva, Voucher Investors Face Lean Times, Moscow TIMES,
May 31, 1994, at 15. Only one-third of the funds studied paid dividends to
shareholders. Id.
" The motivation was, of course, economic. The only way they could be
assured an adequate voice in management decisions and an adequate return
on their investment was to obtain control of the company. Voucher funds
did not pursue an investment strategy of diversification. Instead, they often
preferred to concentrate investments in a small number of companies in
order to exert their influence over management. See Geoff Winestock,
Threat Seen Lurking for Funds, Moscow TIMES, May 31, 1994, at 15.
8 Of course, the fund's ultimate goal was not antagonism with
management, but profit-making. To the extent working with management
generated attractive results, the funds were often just as likely to
collaborate. See id. at 15 (noting that First Voucher Fund would use assets
to buy shares in privatizing companies and then would immediately resell
the shares at a higher price to management seeking to consolidate control).
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engaged in a variety of questionable practices."s
In
particular, they had a poor record of communicating with
shareholders, a situation exacerbated by logistics."8 Funds
also commonly relied on advertisements promising what
amounted to unsustainable returns.8 9 Additionally, the funds
sometimes exceeded investment limitations and failed to

protect shareholders' rights.9
Those funds not engaging in such dubious practices raised
other concerns. Many funds seemed to be self-liquidating.9 "
Studies indicated that funds' average annual expenses equaled
approximately 116 million rubles (approximately $60,000).
With some funds unable to obtain a clear source of income,
particularly given the unwillingness of many companies to pay
dividends, they often obtained operating funds by selling
shares. "2
Overall, funds as a check on management represented at
best a mixed blessing. Funds could play a role in displacing
former state supported directors, but were not necessarily
driven by the best interests of the company. The majority of
funds were primarily concerned with a quick return on their

"' A number of fund-related scandals emerged. In March 1994, the
president of Oil-Diamond-Invest was arrested and at least one-half million
vouchers reported missing. Craig Mellow, Can Russia Vouch for Its
Honesty?, INT'L. HERALD TRIB., June 4-5, 1994, at 11; see also Alexei
Grammatchikov, Point of No Return:Russia's Fund Scams, Moscow TIMES,
May 28, 1994, at 1.
"' Some of the reasons for the inattentiveness were practical. With so
many individuals contributing one or two vouchers, the funds found
themselves with enormous numbers of small shareholders. They often
lacked the resources to send a notice of the meeting by registered mail to
every shareholder.
8 See infra note 101.
9 The problems ranged from refusing to hold annual meetings of
shareholders to holding meetings without a quorum.
9' "The small [voucher funds] are mostly run by cowboys. However, the
larger ones-like First Voucher and Alfa, which between them have
collected 4.8 m[illion] vouchers-are turning into serious investment
managers with amazing speed." High Stakes on the High Steppe, supranote
11.
"' In general, the abuses went unchecked by regulatory officials, though
some enforcement activity did occur. In the oblasts, property management
committees, often in consultation with local prosecutors and finance and tax
offices, did conduct inspections of funds or attempt to prosecute some of the
most serious frauds. Enforcement activity at the federal level, however,
remained essentially nonexistent.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.

[Vol. 15:4

investments and did not attempt to improve management
skills or long-term profitability.
In more developed markets, the goals of profitability and
improved management usually coincide.
This was not,
however, the case in Russia. Due to a high inflation rate and
the absence of a liquid secondary market, long-term
investments and improvements in performance were not
favored. Instead, the funds focused on large investments
followed by quick liquidation, often selling to a strategic
investor.9"
Among other things, this meant that any
financial investment returns accrued to the fund rather than
the company.
The case of Vermani, a pasta manufacturer in Nizhny
Novgorod, illustrated the realities of investment fund
ownership.
Favored by the government, the company
possessed foreign-made machinery and had access to highquality raw materials from external suppliers. Recently
modernized, the company re-tooled during a four year period
beginning in 1989. Vermani was, therefore, well positioned to
carve out a niche in the privatized Russian economy.
4
In privatizing, the company selected the second option.1
Management and employees acquired fifty-one percent of the
shares, while twenty-nine percent were sold at a voucher
auction. One of the largest voucher funds in Russia purchased
sixteen percent of the shares. The fund was consigned a
minority position, with managers and employees owning a
majority of the shares. The former state supported directors,
therefore, were firmly in control.
Vermani, however, did not escape the Russian economy.
Purchasers of the pasta, experiencing financial difficulties, fell
behind in their payments. As a result, Vermani could not pay
its suppliers, threatening continued production. To remedy
the situation, a general manager of the company attempted to
institute a number of reforms, most noticeably requiring
purchasers to pay cash on delivery. The manager also wanted
to implement a marketing and advertising campaign, as well

g Some funds have publicly indicated that these types of transactions
represent the best hope for profitability and have specifically disparaged
diversified, small investments as an acceptable alternative. See Winestock,
supra note 85, at 15.
" See supra § 2.
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as a search for foreign investors.
The general director, a hold-over from the central planning
days, objected to the new approach. At the December 1993
shareholders' meeting, the general director and other old style
directors were ousted. The reform oriented manager succeeded
in becoming the general director, but only after striking a
faustian bargain with the voucher fund. The reconstituted
board included the manager, a representative of the property
fund, a representative of employees, and two representatives
of the fund. One of the fund's directors was elected Chairman
with the property fund's support.
The directors clashed almost immediately. The Chairman
insisted that suppliers provide one month of raw materials in
advance of any payment. This policy was rejected by a number
of suppliers, which caused the plant's production level to fall.
As conditions worsened, the voucher fund continued to
accumulate shares, finding willing sellers among investors
unhappy with the company's declining prospects and among
the previously ousted managers. By March 1994, the fund's
holdings climbed to thirty-one percent, while the percentage
held by employees and management fell to forty percent. The
local property fund continued to own twenty percent.9 5
The fund, therefore, played a significant role in the removal
of the old-line management, a necessary condition for the
company's success. Nonetheless, with two directors on the
board, and the post of Chairman, the fund obtained control of
the company. The fund did not, however, intend to use control
to further the long term prospects of the company, but to
achieve the short term benefit of bringing in a strategic
investor. In short, that meant replacing the company's
management, whether or not competent, and selling to an
investor,96 with the company not benefiting directly from the
"' Voucher funds could not purchase more than 15% of a company's
shares. Funds, however, sometimes used a management group to buy
additional shares and skirt the restriction. See Rubinfien & Guyon, supra,
note 75, at 12.
" In a more efficient market, a strategic investor might retain existing
management if deemed competent. In Russia, however, the lack of market
checks on managerial behavior placed a heightened premium on selecting
those that would run the company. As a practical matter, therefore,
strategic investors wanted their own designees, irrespective of the existing
management's basic competency.
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transaction."
Funds, therefore, represented a mechanism for displacing
existing management. This was only possible in companies
where management had not consolidated its control through
the acquisition of company shares, or in the case of Vermani,
where existing divisions within the company meant that
employees would not act in a unified fashion. On the other
hand, from the perspective of possible insurgents within a
company, relying on voucher funds and other outside investors
to displace existing management represented a doubled-edged
sword.
5. THE BEGINNINGS OF MARKET DISCIPLINE AND THE
EMERGENCE OF THE PRIMARY OFFERING PROCESS

As a device designed to influence management, voucher
funds were only occasionally effective. The capital markets
represented another possible mechanism for influencing the
behavior of management. Initially, however, this was not the
case. By selling shares for vouchers rather than cash,
managers had little awareness of the relationship between
profit enhancing behavior and the attraction of capital.
Moreover, aware of examples such as Vermani, management
developed an aversion to free-floating shares."8
Nonetheless, by late 1993, companies desperate for capital
began to sell shares for cash in primary distributions. This
raised the possibility that the desire to attract outside
investors would cause a shift in management's behavior.
Again, however, the realities of the Russian markets dictated
a different result.
Russian capital markets were highly
disorganized and not yet capable of absorbing large offerings.
The market was also atomistic. Formal links among the
brokers were weak. Although brokers sometimes created
" This assumes that a strategic investor otherwise would have had to
purchase the shares directly from the company. In that way, the investment
would have benefitted the company directly. Often, however, this would not
be the case. With management having accumulated large numbers of
shares, the strategic investor could purchase a controlling block directly
from them. Whether from management or from a voucher fund, the
acquisition would not benefit the company directly.
" Examples such as Vermani reinforced the views of soviet style
directors that free-floating shares constituted a danger that should be
avoided.
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informal contacts within their own regions, the networks
tended to be ad hoc and did not operate interregionally. With
little secondary trading taking place, brokers had few reasons
to relate with those in other regions."
With the links among brokers poorly developed,
particularly on an interregional basis, selling-syndicates were
Companies
difficult, if not impossible, to create.1 "
interested in offerings, therefore, had to arrange their own
selling efforts. This initially meant aggressive advertising,
with television commercials and subway advertisements
promising 2000% returns. 1 1
In addition, the infrastructure necessary to facilitate
0
Russia had no central
secondary trading did not exist.0'
9 Automobile All-Russian Alliance ("AVVA") probably was an exception.
It constituted the first real national offering. See infra note 124.
'**Syndicates within a particular region were possible, since groups of
brokers knew each other and often worked together. Given the size of the
regional market, intra-regional syndicates in places such as Moscow had
significant placement power.
,01 These types of advertisements obviously appealed to base motivations
such as greed. In should be noted, however, that Russia still had an
inflation rate above 100% by mid-1994. Individuals were therefore attracted
by a return that would maintain the real value of money, requiring rates far
beyond those in the United States. The flagrant use of advertisements led
to a presidential decree on the subject, although with little impact
immediately apparent. See Decree of the President of the Russian
Federation on Protecting Consumers Against Misleading Advertising,
Vedomosti SRSR, Issue No. 1183 (1994). The decree attempted to prevent
promises of excessive returns by requiring the disclosure of the "actual
amount" of interest or dividends paid in a prior period, and prohibiting the
provision of information about future payments. The decree applied to
advertising in the mass media, as well as other public advertisements, such
as billboards and vehicles. At least from a cursory review of advertisements
on Russian television, the commercials for investments continued to display
piles of money and use other methods of hype, but deleted all references to
specific returns. Another decree prohibited advertisements from containing
guarantees of future dividends. Decree of the Russian Federation on
Protecting Interest of Investors Vedomosti RSFSR, No. 1233, No. 4 (1994).
The same decree also indicated that the use of knowingly false
advertisements would be the basis for voiding an offering of shares. Id. § 9.
102 Generalizations such as this must be made carefully and are subject
to a host of exceptions. An active market did exist for shares of companies
that were the subject of attempts to acquire or retain control. Typically,
purchasers would commission brokers to scour the market for shares. In a
few instances, issuers would promise to repurchase their own shares,
although the substance of the promise was often unclear. Finally, a
secondary market of sorts existed for some foreign investors. While most
foreign investors came in as strategic partners, a few were buying small
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location for reporting transactions. Nor had an appreciable
quantity of trades occurred over licensed stock exchanges. The
vast number of transactions were executed in the over-thecounter market ("OTC"). The OTC had little transparency,
with brokers neither reporting the quantity nor the price of
the transaction.
Similarly, no defined rules of behavior existed within the
brokerage community. They had not engaged in significant
Moreover, while some exchanges had
self-regulation. 1 '
established rules regulating brokers, the restrictions had little
salutary effect. As a result, brokers did not report trades,
observe limits on mark-ups charged on shares, or recognize
fiduciary-type duties to clients. 1 4
The markets, therefore, had significant problems with
transparency and differentiation. In the absence of listing
standards, transparent share price information, and rules of
behavior for brokers (whether imposed by the government or
through some type of self-regulation), the market had no way
of distinguishing legitimate companies from illegitimate ones.
Small investors could not distinguish sound investments from
unsound ones, or even if they were paying a "fair" price for the
shares.
5.1. PrimaryOfferings
Privatization meant that although the lingering interest
of the local property funds provided some opportunity for
continued state interference, the government in most instances

percentages of Russian companies by 1994. Stories of the tremendous
undervaluation of business assets in Russia had spurred some to take a
harder look at the country. Only a handful of foreign brokers had a
significant staff in Russia, with Credit Suisse First Boston having the
largest presence.
103 In early 1994, a trading association began in St. Petersburg. The
association did not, however, adopt rules governing broker behavior. See
discussion infra § 7.2.
104 Practical impediments also existed. In many instances, management
had gone to great lengths to acquire a controlling block of shares. An
offering could dilute the controlling block. As the prior example of Vermani
in Nizhny Novgorod illustrates, see supra notes 94-97 and accompanying
text, having too many freely transferable shares meant that outside
investors, including voucher funds, could acquire large, perhaps controlling,
blocks and use them to displace management.
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no longer controlled enterprises."° Production was to be
determined by market forces rather than government fiat. The
demise of central control also meant an end, for the most part,
to government financing.'O' Funding had to come from the
capital markets."
In recognition of this fact, the Russian government
established an extensive system to regulate primary
offerings.'" Shares had to be registered with the Ministry
of Finance and had to be accompanied by a prospectus. 0 9 A
public issue included offerings of shares to more than 100
persons, or having a value of more than fifty million rubles (an
increasingly insignificant threshold with the continuing

10

To encourage property funds to dispose of their residual interest, the
privatization program prohibited companies with more than 10% of shares
owned by a property fund from issuing additional shares. MODEL CHARTER,
supra note 6, art. 5.3.6. Given the immense need for capital in the postprivatization world, this was potentially a significant incentive. Of course,
as long as the capital markets remained undeveloped, foreclosing that
avenue, the threat was minimal.
'" Voucher funds, in contrast, were regulated by the GKI. Funds had to
register shares with that organization or a local property management
committee. See SP RSFSR, No. 1186, supra note 64.
10 Banks, of course, represented another potential source of funding.
Bank financing as a source of long-term capital is not without historical
basis. Japanese banks through the 1970's provided most of the funding
needs of companies.
The Japanese government (particularly the
bureaucracy) played an active role in deciding who was to receive funds
from banks. At least with respect to foreign banks, this provided an implicit
guarantee of repayment. In Russia, however, this system would be difficult
to implement. In general, Russian banks do not make long-term loans to
industry, particularly given the difficult financial condition of most Russian
companies. Nor is it likely that the Russian bureaucracy has the skill or
experience to administer a loan program like the one used in Japan.
08
With the concept of authorized but unissued shares absent in Russia,
the first step of the offering process was shareholder approval. Under
Regulation 601, an increase in share capital required the approval of a
majority of outstanding ordinary shares. See Regulation 601, supra note 6,
art. 39 For companies subject to the 1994 privatization program, the
percentage necessary to approve an increase in charter capital was 75%.
MODEL CHARTER, supra note 6, art. 9.10.2. See also Ministry of Finance
Instructions No. 2, art. 4(a) (1992) (as amended on Jan., 27 1993, Feb. 4,
1993 & Nov. 15, 1993).
'" Ministry of Finance Instructions No. 2, supra note 108, art. 7.
Depending on the size of the offering, the filing will be made either with the
Ministry of Finance or a regional subdivision. According to the provision,
approval must be within 45 days. Id.
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decline in the value of the ruble)."0 Companies also had to
pay a tax on the funds raised from the issue of shares.
The Ministry of Finance adopted relatively rigorous content
requirements for prospectuses."' They included three years
of "audited" accounting balances," 2 financial information for
the most recent quarter," disclosure of all shareholders
owing at least five percent of the outstanding shares,14 a
"[b]rief description of the issuer's property and basic types of
its activity,""' and a discussion of any legal sanctions
imposed on the issuer."6
In addition, the prospectus had to include information on
the offering, including both a description of the securities and
the payment terms,"' and a description of the use of
proceeds."' The document had to include risk factors"'
as well as some prospective information. 20 Finally, the

SP RSFSR No. 78, supra note 42, art. 42(b). The regulation also
permitted private placements. Id art. 4(2). A private placement could only
be done "without public announcement" or a "publicity campaign." Id. In
July 1994, the ruble fell to 2000 to the dollar, making 50 million rubles
worth only $25,000.
"' See Ministry of Finance Instructions No. 2, supra note 108,
Addendum 1 (2 March 1992).
12 Id. § 10.
11

's Id,

§ 11.

114 Id

§ 3.

"1 Id. § 12.
The prospectus also had to elucidate "in detail" the
"[pirospects for the sale of products to be manufactured" as well as the
"availability of raw materials, accessory items, production floor-space, and
work force therefore." Id. § 29.
116 Id- § 19.
117
Id. § 22-26.
11 Id § 28. The provision provided that the prospectus had to disclose
"[t]rends in using financial resources mobilized by the issue of securities
(setting up of new production facilities, or expansion, modernization or
reconstruction of already available facilities, nature conservation measures,
development and introduction of new productions processes, etc.) involving
appropriate feasibility studies." Id
1
. See id. § 29 ("Risk factors shall be analyzed separately from economic,
social, technical and ecological factors.").
1 0 See id. ("If financial resources are to be invested in construction or
reconstruction of facilities, information shall be submitted on the
availability of a construction site, documentation on estimated expenditures,
contractor capable of completing given construction and erection work
within a planned time limit."); see also id. §28 (requiring disclosure of
"[trends in financial resources").
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regulations had the typical "catch-all" provisions requiring the
inclusion of any additional information not otherwise
specifically required that could influence "the decision of such
holders and potential purchasers to acquire or dispose of
securities. "1" 1 Companies were also subjected to something
akin to prospectus delivery requirements" and the Ministry
of Finance had stop-order powers.2
Even before the end of privatization, companies began to
enter the capital markets and sell shares; voucher funds and
banks were initially the most relentless sellers. By 1993,
however, operating companies had also entered the market.
This process only highlighted the flaws in the organization of
the capital markets.
Despite their apparent rigor, the disclosure requirements
for offerings were inadequate. In particular, the regulations
did not ensure sufficient financial disclosure. Although the
regulations required audited financial statements, the
information was not particularly useful to investors. Having
arisen in a non-market economy, Russian accounting principles
did not develop out of a need to provide investors with
information necessary to make informed investment decisions,
but rather to meet the needs of government, particularly tax,
authorities.
In addition, companies developed methods of avoiding
much of the more exacting disclosure, most noticeably through
the formation of shells. This enabled companies to respond to
such requirements as the need to provide three years of
financial statements by noting that, from the moment of
registration, the company "had conducted no ... economic

121

Id. § 27.

Id. The provision required that companies "be obliged to make it
possible for every buyer to get acquainted with the terms of sale and the
issue prospectus before they purchase these securities." Id. A 1994
presidential decree required that advertisements concerning shares include
"the date and number of the registration of . .. securities, the place of
registration and the place where prospective buyers c[ould] acquaint
themselves with the terms and conditions of the issue." Vedomosti RSFSR,
No. 1183, supra note 101, § 1.
123 SP RSFSR No. 78, supra note 42, art. 38. The provision allowed the
Ministry of Finance to declare an issue "null and void, to suspend issues or
to refuse to register them" upon a finding that the prospectuses contained
"unreliable and incomplete" data. Id.
'"
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activity."'
The formation of a shell was not entirely an act
of financial obfuscation, but also a desire to sidestep
regulatory restrictions, particularly the need for shareholder
approval of share offerings.1 2 5
Although the prospectuses generally observed the express
regulatory requirements, they clearly did not comply with the
spirit. Prospectuses purported to provide disclosure mandated
by the requirements of the regulation, but in reality, investors
Moreover, while the
received little useful information.
regulations embraced the idea that the documents had to
include all non-required but otherwise relevant information,
issuers all but ignored the provision.
The All-Russian Automobile Alliance ("AVVA") prospectus
illustrated the meager disclosure made during the offering
process. Although filed with the Ministry of Finance and
conforming to the disclosure regulations, the offering document
contained no specific discussion of the use of proceeds, true
risks of the investment, the time frame for when automobile
production would begin, and the controlling shareholders of
the shell company.'
Finally, the disorganized market made the use of registered
share certificates unappealing, resulting in solutions that

124

BOOKLET ON EMISSION OF SHARES OF AUTOMOBILE ALL-RUSSIAN

ALLIANCE JSC, 3 (1993) [hereinafter AVVA PROSPECTUS]. For a discussion
of the AVVA offering, see Elif Kaban, No Regulation,No Security in Russian
Securities, MoSCOW TIMES, July 6, 1994, at 12.
12' Regulation 601 requires shareholders to approve, by simple majority
vote, any "increase [in] the charter capital." Regulation 601, supra note 6,
art. 39. Moreover, the regulations of the Ministry of Finance likewise repeat
that shareholder approval of an increase in capital is a precondition to an
offering. See supra note 108. By forming a shell, presumably only the
shareholders of the shell needed to approve the offering, turning the
requirement into a formality. In the United States acquiring companies
usually form subsidiaries to effectuate mergers for the same reason.
126 With respect to production, the prospectus noted that "[a]ccording to
a tentative forecasting, the volumes of export of VAZ-1116 [model] may be
as high as 50% of annual production." AVVA PROSPECTUS, supra note 124,
at 6. The document, however, contained no information on expected
production, no detailed discussion of the VAZ-1116 model, and no back up
information supporting the projection. There was also no discussion of the
particular export markets where the cars would be sold or the nature of the
competitive conditions that would exist. The prospectus simply noted that
the "world market" showed a "continuously rising demand for" the vehicles.
Id.
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further diminished the rights of shareholders.""7 In place of
certificates, companies sold receipts or other types of bearer
instruments that could be converted into shares."' Holders
of these receipts received the economic, but not the
substantive, benefits of ownership. They were entitled to
dividends, but could not vote at shareholder meetings. 29
The instruments arose in part because of difficulties
associated with the transfer and settlement process,
particularly problems of ownership registration. Bearer
instruments meant that resales could occur without having to
register the ownership interest, thus reducing some of the
counter-party risk.3 0
They also, however, effectively
disenfranchised investors, allowing management to retain
complete control. Companies went to great lengths to
discourage conversion. In at least once instance, management
attempted to minimize the exchange of receipts for shares by
allowing
receipt holders to participate in lotteries for free
3
cars.' '
121 Stock certificates made sales more difficult. Even after a buyer paid
for the shares, significant delay often occurred in the registration of
ownership. Investors therefore had to provide payment, but, for a period of
time, received no indicia of ownership. During this time, they would receive
no dividends and were unable to sell the shares (although they could sell
options in the expectation future delivery would occur). Bearer instruments
sidestepped the problem. The use of bearer instruments permitted outside
investment without dilution of control. See infra note 128.
12 They could not sell bearer stock certificates under Regulation 601.
The issue of "receipts" convertible into shares avoided the limitation. See
Regulation 601, supra note 6, § 57.
"' Shares had to be available for conversion. Nonetheless, Russian law
did not permit authorized but unissued shares. Some companies solved the
problem by issuing the shares to agents (i.e. management) and allowing
them to vote the shares until conversion took place. See AVVA PROSPECTUS,
supra note 124, at 4-5. As a result, those companies effectively gave
management voting control without the need to provide capital.
The sale of a share required a cash payment. Even after payment,
however, the interest had to be recorded in the company registry. Brokers
in outlying areas would often communicate with a company, or a company's
registrar, on an infrequent basis. The party that paid for the shares would
receive no ownership rights (including the right to the payment of
dividends) until the registration process had been completed. By purchasing
a bearer instrument, ownership transferred immediately. While the
purchase of the instrument did not provide any rights as a shareholder, it
did immediately provide the right to the economic attributes of ownership.
' This was the approach used by the Automobile All-Russia Alliance,
or AVVA. See AVVA PROSPECTUS, supra note 124, at 5 (noting that the
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5.2. Limitations on the DistributionProcess
Disclosure was only part of the problem.

Companies

undertaking a public offering needed a distribution system for

the shares. Distribution in other industrial countries typically
involved a network of brokers that could place the shares with
its customers. Broker networks sufficient to place a large
scale offering in Russia did not, however, exist.
In the absence of a sufficiently developed market to handle
primary distributions, each company had to find its own
method of selling shares. To spur demand, companies often
resorted to high-profile advertising, including print
advertisements and television commercials.'3 2 The statutes
governing advertising provided only that the funds could not
"promise positive returns to investors or ... promise to
redeem shares . . . .""s The issuance of shares was also
expensive, with one market participant estimating that costs
accounted for ten to twenty percent of the value of each

issue.'"
This did not mean a broker-free distribution process. In
fact, companies often used a particular broker, or group of
brokers, to act as selling agents."' To the extent other

right to participate in the automobile lottery "is annulled after the
certificate has been exchanged for that of a certain number of shares").
2 The government had almost no regulations governing advertisements.
Companies simply could not advertise securities "in mass media before the
registration of the relevant issue prospectuses in the Ministry of Economics
and Finance." RSFSR No. 78, supra note 42, Item 39. See also Vedomosti
RSFSR Issue No. 1233, Item No. 8 (1994) (prohibiting advertising campaigns
concerning public issues prior to the registration of the issue prospectus).
Similarly, while the civil code contained the concept of tortious liability, its
applicability to the securities markets was surrounded by doubt.
I" SP RSFSR No. 1186, supra note 64, at Supp. No. 2, Item No. 43.
MMM Investment Fund is a particularly apt example. The fund flooded
Russian television with short commercials, ranging from a retired woman
extolling the virtues of investing, to pictures of growing stacks of money.
The Fund promised returns of no less than 2000% to 3000%. See, e.g., Back
From the Grave, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 1994, at 88. For a discussion of the
Fund and some of its interaction with Russian civil authorities, see Will the
Fund's Bubble Burst?, Moscow TIMES, June 9, 1994, at 14.
a R.K. Vardanian, Draft Conference Speech (June 22, 1994) (on file with
the University of PennsylvaniaJournal of InternationalBusiness Law).
"sThe offering by Doka-Khleb (Doka Bread) included a group of brokers
organized by the lead manager, Novy Soyuz. Each member of the group
received a quota of shares to sell. To encourage the brokers to meet their
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brokers wanted shares to sell, they had to contact a selling
broker and acquire the shares directly, cash on delivery." 6
Consequently, brokers located in distant regions had to fly to
Moscow with the necessary funds. Given the difficulties with
payment transfers in the banking system, this meant
physically transporting cash. They returned with bearer
certificates or other documents representing ownership.'"
The sale of shares issued by AWA represented the first
significant national offering and highlighted the problems with
the distribution process. To market the shares nationally,
AWA had to hire a share depository, a selling agent to receive
payments in each region.18
The depository retained an
inventory of share receipts,'39 which the agent sold pursuant
to a standardized contract provided by AWA. The bank acted
as the cashier. Once AWA was informed electronically of the
signing of the contract and the deposit of the purchase price in
the bank, 4" the depository would be instructed to release an
appropriately numbered receipt.
This system was functional but time consuming and
impersonal.
First, AWA had to enter into separate

quotas, the company provided, among other enticements, prizes, such as
trips abroad. See DOKA KHLEB, SHARE PROSPECTUS (1994) (on file with the
Journal).
13 Brokers often targeted unsophisticated investors. They would set up
'fund shops," which were offices that sold the shares of the largest and most
broadly advertised companies. Movie theaters were favorite locations for
the shops, attracting large groups of people.
" In this sense, the brokers were dealers, risking their own capital until
the shares could be resold. In a more developed market, this would entail
considerable risk, particularly given possible shifts in share prices. In
Russia, however, this was less risky. With no secondary market, brokers
did not have to worry about sudden price fluctuation and, with no price
disclosure, they did not have to worry about small spreads. The only real
risk was that brokers would be left without a buyer because demand would
be insufficient. By the summer of 1994, some Moscow brokers had opened
sales offices in other cities, such as Nizhny Novgorod. These offices did
little, however, except sell shares of widely advertised companies.
18 Although conceptually distinct, particular entities sometimes had
overlapping tasks. A bank could, for example, act both as a depository and
as a bank.
18 AVVA did not sell registered shares, but receipts that could be
converted into shares. The offering, however, had built- in disincentives to
conversion. See supra note 128.
1"
The purchase price was deposited typically by electronic mail,
although in some instances it was done by phone.
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agreements with each party involved. Second, companies
seeking to use a similar arrangement had to create their own
network with their own agreements. Despite its drawbacks,
however, the system facilitated national distribution and
avoided the
need of regional brokers to fly to Moscow to obtain
1 41
inventory.
Anecdotal evidence suggested that the typical purchasers
of the shares or receipts, were unsophisticated investors."
The instruments were sold for cash to anyone who wanted to
purchase them. Frequently, brokers did not record the names
of the purchasers, indicating that they had little interest in
creating permanent customer relationships.
6. ORDER FROM DISORDER: DIFFERENTIATION AND THE

DEVELOPMENT OF A SECONDARY MARKET
6.1. The Need for Differentiation
Many of the problems within the Russian financial markets
were attributable to, or exacerbated by, the absence of a
secondary market. Managers generally had no cause to worry
about the effect of their behavior on share prices. Moreover,
the absence of trading markets heightened tensions between
management and outside shareholders. Low share prices,
enabled investors to purchase large blocks of share and
successfully oust management. Consequently, managers grew
wary of outside shareholders and free-trading shares.
Most noticeably, however, the absence of a secondary
market impaired the capital raising process. Shareholders
could not rely on the possibility of appreciation and resale to
achieve the necessary gain. Dividend rates, therefore, were
the primary basis for obtaining a return. This gave an
advantage to companies promising high returns, while putting
pressure on others to pay out earnings to shareholders instead
of reinvesting them in the business.
141 With depositories physically located in the region, brokers did not
have to expend their own capital to acquire inventory. In this sense they
did not act as dealers. The burden was on AVVA to ensure that each
regional depository had an adequate supply of inventory.

" See Elif Kaban, Stock Exchange in a Briefcase, Moscow TIMES, June
28, 1994, at 12 (discussing "briefcase traders" who sell shares on street
corners and in metro stations).
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The development of a secondary market was therefore
critical to the capital raising process and to modify
management's behavior. The creation of such a market,
however, was no easy task, requiring the development of an
organized system for differentiating among brokers and
issuers.
Broker behavior was largely unregulated. A broker had to
obtain a license, from the Ministry of Finance. 1 3 To obtain
the license the broker merely had to include certified
specialists on its staff, comply with minimal capital
44
requirements, and adhere to certain accounting provisions.
This regulatory regime did not mandate price disclosure and
basic rules of behavior. Moreover, although the Ministry of
Finance theoretically had the power to revoke licenses in
certain circumstances, it rarely did so. Given the absence of
behavioral rules and price transparency, investors lacked the
necessary information to determine which brokers would most
likely act in their best interests.
Similarly, the market contained an undifferentiated class
of issuers. Legitimate companies had few ways of signaling to
potential investors that they were, in fact, financially sound
investments. 45
Disclosure standards were almost
nonexistent. In addition, these companies had to compete with
less reputable firms that used aggressive advertising
techniques to sell shares. 4 6
, See SP RSFSR No. 78, supra note 42, Item 21.
See id. Item Nos. 23 & 30.
1" The prospectus for Doka Khleb (Doka Bread) disclosed that the
company wanted to manufacture and sell mini-bakery units and pizzerias.
DOKA KHLEB, supra note 135,
12. The prospectus contained a relatively
insightful discussion about the bread industry in Russia and the need for
smaller, more flexible manufacturing units. Id. 1 28, § 1.2. The document
included details on the use of proceeds, the volume of production from the
mini-bakeries, and the estimated sale price of the units. Id. § 2. In addition,
the prospectus contained three risk factors, including "the undeveloped state
of the Russian stock market." Id. 1 29. Nonetheless, despite the disclosure,
pertinent information was still missing. The Doka Khleb prospectus
contained no financial disclosure or information about SRC Doka-Pizza, the
controlling shareholder. Moreover, besides noting that the design for the
ovens had been under development at SRC Doka-Pizza for two years, id.
128, §1.1., the document contained little specific information about the
principal product to be sold by the company.
14
This begs the difficult question of adequate disclosure, particularly in
connection with financial disclosure.
14
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Serious investors did not have any easy way to distinguish
among companies. Due to the generally low level of disclosure,
adequate financial information on companies rarely
existed.1 4 7 In addition, brokers did not act as adequate

filters. Often brokers were less concerned with the underlying
value of shares than with their ability to induce
unsophisticated investors to make purchases.'4 The system
made it difficult for retail investors to participate in the
securities markets. Only the largest investors had the time
and resources necessary to conduct their own independent
investigations of particular companies.
The market, therefore, needed to provide mechanisms that
would, to some degree, distinguish issuers and reduce the
transaction costs for investors.
Increased disclosure
represented the best mechanism for accomplishing these goals.

In the case of brokers, disclosure meant transparent price
information. In the case of issuers, it meant the availability
of relevant financial information. Neither would occur as the

result of legal reform but only after the parties appreciated the
benefits that flowed from the heightened disclosure.
6.2. Disclosure
6.2.1. Issuer Disclosure
Issuer disclosure fell into two categories. The first type
involved the offering process. This required improvements in
the contents of the prospectus used in the distribution of
shares. Although detailed regulations existed, they had little
14' See, e.g., The Eighth Sister, ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 1994, at 93
("Gazprom ... publishes no accounts. In part this reflects traditional
Russian secrecy, in part the fact that its corporate structure is so vague that
it is hard to present consolidated accounts.").
14 At a Moscow meeting of the selling group for Doka-Khleb in June
1994, the brokers showed little interest in the operations of the company
and were more concerned with the amount of advertising designed to
increase investor interest. Brokers sometimes had access to non-public
information about the operations of client companies. Accordingly, they
could provide some degree of guidance on distinguishing good for bad
investments. In general, however, they did not provide this type of
information to ordinary retail investors. Moreover, it was always difficult
to determine whether a recommendation was based on the broker's
perception about the future of the company or a desire to promote a
corporate client.
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real teeth and resulted in little useful disclosure.14
The
Ministry of Finance reviewed and approved prospectuses, but
seemed to exercise minimal oversight of their contents. 150
The second category involved continual disclosure to the
market. Companies were already required to update the
market on a regular basis. 5 ' For example, Regulation 601
required joint-stock companies to "publish quarterly and
circulate to stockholders the balance sheet of the society, the
profit and losses account, and other current information."152
The regulation, however, contained few specifics about how
to disseminate the information or the contents of these reports.
A presidential decree addressed the issue in June 1994."' s
The decree required open joint-stock companies who traded
their shares to publish quarterly financial information in "the
popular press.""

The edict specified that the information

had to be published in a particular type of printed medium and
freely distributed throughout the territory where the company
was registered. 5 '
These dissemination requirements had little utility absent
a mechanism for ensuring an adequate level of disclosure. In
the context of both primary offering and secondary trading
disclosure, the system lacked qualitative standards designed

'

See supra note 126.

1

sThis explains a company's ability to use shells when making a public

offering. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text. A completely
different issue was the reform of financial disclosure and the development
of more market-driven accounting standards. See discussion infra § 5.1.
151 The same concern arose during the development of the U.S. securities
laws. The Securities Act of 1933 provided for mandatory registration of
public offerings. See 15 U.S.C. § 77a, et seq. The Act, however, was
criticized for not providing continual disclosure to the investing public, one
of the principal goals of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78a, et seq.
152 Regulation 601, supra note 6. Companies also had to disclose, within
two months after the holding of the annual meeting, "the annual report and
balance sheet" in a form determined by the Ministry of Finance. See id.
Item 87.
'IId
at Item No. 6.
15 Id. at Item No. 6. The Decree specifically required the disclosure of
balances and profit-loss accounts. Id.
1
'"Id. Item No. 6. For companies with more that 5000 shareholders, the
medium had to have a circulation of at least 50,000 and be freely distributed
throughout the Russian Federation. Id. at art. 7. The precise publication
was to be determined by the company's board of directors. Id.
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to maximize the usefulness of the information to investors.
The existing regulatory regimes would have little impact until
effective standards were developed.
For qualitative standards to arise, however, demand had to
exist in the market. This meant that dynamics in the market
had to exist to promote proper disclosure. Investors had to
appreciate and want the information and companies had to see
the benefits of disclosure.
6.2.2. PriceDisclosure
Brokers in Russia did not disclose price information on a
current basis.'
In most emerging markets, stock exchange
rules dictated disclosure requirements. An exchange, in its
simplest form, involved a centralized place for bringing
together buyers and sellers, with public reporting of trades in
the securities of listed companies.'
In addition, exchanges
also regulated broker behavior by the creation of basic
obligations toward investors, reporting requirements, and
mechanisms for monitoring broker behavior and enforcement
of the rules.
Exchanges in Russia did not, however, play this role. By
presidential decree, the Ministry of Finance was granted the
authority to license exchanges. Exchanges were required to be
established in the form of a closed joint-stock company owned
exclusively by members.'
Under Ministry rules, the
exchanges had to create provisions governing membership and
qualifications for members. 5 '
In addition, the licensing
procedures contemplated the use of listing standards, to be
developed by the exchange in agreement with the Ministry of
Finance. 60
'" Some brokers did advertise bid and ask prices in the mass media.
There was no guarantee, though, that the broker would abide by the prices.
Instead, the advertisement often included attractive prices to induce
inquiries and allow the broker to obtain additional customers.
1"7 This leaves aside the market maker/specialist function, which is
primarily to ensure stability by providing additional, temporary liquidity to
the market.
'" See SP RSFSR no. 78, supra note 42, art. 55. They were to be
organized as a non-profit organizations. See also id. art. 57 (requiring
registration with the Ministry of Finance).
19 See id. arts. 61 & 62.

...See id. art. 64. The regulations issued by the Ministry of Finance
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The combination of loose requirements and ease of
obtaining a license led to the proliferation of stock exchanges.
At one point, Russia had over 120 exchanges. As recently as
the summer of 1994, Moscow still had four: the Russia Stock
Exchange, Moscow Central Stock Exchange, Moscow Interbank
Currency Exchange, and the Moscow International Stock
Exchange. More significant than the number, however, brokers
did not execute trades over the exchanges in any appreciable
quantity. 6 '
Not all exchanges, however, operated in a haphazard or
random fashion. In Novosibirsk, a major center in Siberia, for
example, the Siberian Stock Exchange or Sibex engaged in a
deliberate effort to consolidate exchanges.
Formed in
February 1991, Sibex had, by the summer of 1994, absorbed
most of the other major Siberian stock exchanges. Sibex
established listing standards for issuers, 2 rules governing
specialists, and provisions for members.'
The exchange
also developed standardized contracts for the sale of both
stocks and options, held educational programs for its members,
and imposed prohibitions on insider trading by its employees.
Despite these efforts, Sibex suffered similar problems to
those that occurred at other exchanges throughout Russia.
While items traded on the Sibex exchange included stocks,
bank credit, foreign exchange and futures (primarily on foreign
exchange and vouchers), vouchers transactions constituted the
bulk of its business. The exchange executed only a small
largely fleshed out the system. The rules of the exchanges had to include,
among other requirements: (1) the submission of price information; (2) the
compulsory publication of information on companies listed on the exchange,
(3) the prevention of "dishonest transactions," and (4) the rights and
obligations of exchange members. See Id. § 6.
161 Interestingly, in a number of regions, exchanges did bring together
buyers and sellers. Brokers would often travel to the physical location of
the exchange where they could determine the inventory of other brokers and
engage in trades. The trades were not, however, reported to the exchange
or made public.
162 Only one small exchange in Western Siberia continued to operate. In
Eastern Siberia, Vladivostok was the only other potential financial center
with stock exchanges unabsorbed by Sibex.
1'

Among other requirements, the listing standards called for issuers to

provide mandatory disclosure to Sibex on a quarterly basis and in a
condition acceptable to the exchange. Issuers also were required to inform
Sibex of forthcoming changes in the company which could alter the quality

of the securities.
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number of equity trades.
Thus, the exchanges played a minor role and remained
largely irrelevant to the emerging secondary markets.
Because of the absence of effective exchanges, the reporting of
share prices in the secondary market often did not.'"
Listing standards that elevated corporate behavior,
particularly through increased financial disclosure, did not
exist. In general, brokers profited from the opaque markets.
Investors did not know the price paid by the dealer and did not
know the mark up charged on the transaction.'
Companies
also profited because an opaque market could obscure their
true financial condition, thereby reducing the risk of a hostile
acquisition attempt.
7. THE CATALYST FOR REFORM AND THE ORGANIZATION OF
THE MARKETS

Exchanges were not going to provide the structure
necessary for organized securities markets. Nor would this
occur through legal reform. Russia already had a tolerable, if
not acceptable, legal infrastructure covering securities
transactions. Consequently, establishing order would mean
assisting the dynamics which were already emerging in the
markets. Some brokers and companies, for instance, were
already seeing the benefits of differentiation and disclosure,
something that could be facilitated with additional assistance.
7.1. Overview
Increased information would facilitate the development of
the securities markets. Investors would have a basis for
distinguishing among companies and brokers without having

'" Exchanges were required to publicize price information. To avoid this
reporting requirement, brokers generally did not make trades over the
exchange. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
'" Markups should be distinguished from transaction costs. Brokers in
outlying regions who wanted to sell shares of a Moscow issue had to
physically travel to Moscow and use their own funds to make purchases.
These transaction costs would be passed on to investors in the form of
higher prices. Markups, on the other hand, were increases in price due to
the absence of transparency and the lack of information that would enable
investors to know that they could obtain the shares elsewhere at a lower
price.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss4/1
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to perform time-intensive and expensive investigations. This,
in turn, would promote confidence, facilitate investment, and
increases market liquidity. While a relatively uncontroversial
goal, the means of increasing the amount of information
remained the principal uncertainty.
Stock exchanges were not the answer. In other emerging
markets, stock exchanges typically handled the function of
price disclosure and, to a lesser extent, corporate
disclosure. 1
The stock exchanges regulate brokers and
ensure that transactions are properly reported. With respect
to issuers, listing standards impose a high level of disclosure,
particularly financial. The absence of one national exchange,
however, prevented the successful development of a similar
arrangement in Russia."
Nor would reforms likely flow from government initiatives.
First, the existing bureaucracies had shown little
understanding of the operation of the securities markets. The
government did not encourage the use of central trading
markets and, in fact, adopted policies that discouraged their
use.
The Ministry of Finance imposed a tax on stock
transactions conducted over the exchanges, thereby
contributing to the flow of business into the OTC market.
Similarly, government oriented solutions were likely to
stunt the development of the securities markets. In the
aftermath of financial scandals such as MMM, government
proposals sometimes surfaced that seemed designed to protect
investors from their own folly. They contemplated limits on
the number and type of companies that could sell shares or on
the types of institutions that could buy them. In short, this
meant a form of merit regulation.
The Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange or Micex, the
currency exchange, illustrated the problems that could arise.
The City of Moscow had some independent authority to impose
1'

This was true in the emerging markets of Eastern Europe. Poland,

Hungary, and the Czech Republic, all had central stock exchanges that

imposed rules of behavior on their members.
" While not completely clear, the use of exchanges raised some political
considerations. Licensed by the Ministry of Finance, the exchanges were
sometimes owned in part by the government. The people operating the
exchanges often had connections to the government or to government
officials. The exchanges' commitment to a more openly traded market was
therefore sometimes suspect.
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taxes. Recognizing the high level of trading taking place on
Micex, the mayor of Moscow imposed a tax on transactions,
causing volume on the exchange to plummet.'
A
centralized stock exchange would have provided intrusive
bureaucracies with a similar target.
Indeed, the most obvious government agency that could
have brought some degree of order to the markets-the
Ministry of Finance-did not demonstrate the requisite level
of skill or commitment to make the requirements work. The
Ministry had control over the licensing of brokers and
exchanges and over the review of prospectuses but resolutely
failed to use its authority to establish reasonable
standards.' 9
Finally, even if the government had issued the appropriate
edicts, there is no reason to believe that they would have been
followed. In a number of instances, the President issued
decrees designed to affect company practices. These decrees
included requirements to use independent registrars and
prohibitions on excessive advertising. Neither, however,
seemed to have had the intended effect.'70
7.2. The Market Solution
Presidential decrees or Duma-adopted laws, therefore,
would not solve the market's disorder. Enhancing the
authority of the bureaucracy would similarly be ineffective.
Only by encouraging market forces already in place would the
markets become more transparent and effective. For a market

168Exchange Cuts Charges, Moscow

TIMES, July 1, 1994.
Despite its authority, the Ministry of Finance did not take proactive
measures in the market and, as a result, little enforcement occurred.
Brokers receiving licenses had little fear of revocation. Prospectus reviews
did not result in meaningful disclosure standards. Therefore, enhancing the
Ministry of Finance's oversight seemed unlikely to bring much additional
order to the market. In addition, the Ministry of Finance may have had
motives inconsistent with an open market. Because banks represented a
strong interest group, the order imposed on the market may have been
designed more to meet the banks' needs than to facilitate trading.
170 See, e.g., Mikhail Dubik, Enforcers Vow To Target FraudulentAds,
Moscow TIMES, July 6, 1994, at 11 (discussing comments made by Natalya
Fonaryova, Deputy Head of the State Antitrust Committee who stated that
more than 80% of the advertisements for finance and insurance companies
169

were in violation of presidential decree).
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driven solution to succeed brokers and issuers themselves had
to recognize the need for differentiation and take steps to
implement such a process.
By early 1994, this had tentatively begun. Brokers in St.
Petersburg and other Russian cities formed associations. These
organizations were rudimentary and apparently intended
primarily to lobby the government. 1
Nonetheless, they
illustrated the growing recognition within the market about
the need to differentiate.
The most significant early efforts occurred in Moscow. In
the summer of 1994, brokers took affirmative steps toward the
organization of a trading association. A group met in late
June and early July to devise a charter and create a set of
rudimentary rules for the association. 7 By the end of the
summer, nascent associations had appeared in other
cities.'73
Self-regulation as a solution to a disorganized market had
a number of advantages. First, rules of behavior and listing
standards, in short, methods of differentiation, would develop.
Second, in a country with many laws but little compliance,
standards developed by the market participants themselves
had a greater potential of being observed. Third, regulations
created by market participants were less likely than a
bureaucratic solution to conflict with market development.
At the same time, however, self-regulation posed risks.
Standards could be set too low. 4 Meaningful enforcement
of an association's rules also raised concerns. Only true

...The Director of the Property Fund in St. Petersburg initiated these

efforts.

17 See Charter of the Professional Association of Securities Market
Participants (1994)(copy on file with the Journal). The founders approved
the charter on July 15, 1994. Id. The initial members included Analyse,

Aton, BK Bransvik, Grant, A/O KC First Boston, NIKOil, NIKA, Olma,
RINAKO Plus, Troyka-Dialog, Finable, C.A. & Co. Ltd., Tserih, Trustovaya
Investizionnaya Finansovaya Companiya, and UniTrust. Id. § 3.
173 Organizational meetings took place in other Russian cites. In certain
regions, however, brokers did not develop an appreciation for the reasons for
organizing, and so did not take any steps in that direction. In some
instances, mutual distrust among brokers impeded the development of

collective associations.
114 This seems to be a problem that arguably will correct itself over time.
Once reasonable differentiation begins, market forces (primarily demand

from investors) presumably will insist on stricter standards.
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enforcement would give membership and the rules regulating
membership behavior substantive meaning. In part, this
required adequate authority to penalize violations. It also
necessitated the development of a transparent and
procedurally sound system for imposing penalties that would
give the public both access to and confidence in the process.
In addition, regional trading associations created
immediate problems of standardization. As groups began to
arise in various regions, no guarantee existed over common
standards for all associations. Standardization did not rule
out the possibility of variations among associations, but did
contemplate the need for a universal base. This provided the
investing public with some level of assurance that all
association members and listed companies would meet a
common, set of minimum requirements.
These problems meant that a role-albeit a limited oneremained for government involvement in the development of
the securities markets. This role was likely to fall to the
RFCSE, an "independent" agency. "Independent" meant that
the organization fell under the supervision of the President,
rather than the Prime Minister or Duma.'75 The RFCSE
officially came into existence in October 1992. In reality,
however, formation took much longer, having to overcome
considerable political impediments.
Consisting of a "collective body," members to the
Commission were to be affirmed by the President. 7 ' The
body had to be composed of representatives from most of the
entities that regulated the securities markets, including "the
State Committee of the Russian Federation for management
of state property, the Ministry of Finance, the State
Committee for anti-monopoly policy, the Central Bank,
Russian

Fund

of

Federal

Property[,

and]

... stock

exchanges." 7 '
17. See SP RSFSR, No. 1186, supra note 64, Supp. No. 2, Item No. 43.
The Decree provides that the agency's membership shall include
representatives of the Committee for the Management of State Property, the
Ministry of Finance, the Anti-Trust Commission, the Central Bank, the
Federal Property Fund, and the stock exchanges. Id.
176 Regulations for the Commission on Securities and Stock Exchanges
of the President of the Russian Federation § 1.2, aff'd by Exec. order No. 163
(1993).
117 Id..
The structure of the Commission was to comprise of the
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The regulation provided RFCSE with a thin agenda.
Specifically, the agency had the task of devising and enforcing
regulations to govern the "issu[ancel and circulation of
securities as well as the activity of professional participants of
securities market." 7 '
The RFCSE was also to develop
uniform procedures, book-keeping requirements,
and
accounting rules.'
Finally, the regulation authorized the
agency to adopt rules regulating shareholder meetings.
Although ostensibly assigned to oversee the securities
markets, the RFCSE lacked jurisdiction over the participants.
The Ministry of Finance, not the RFCSE, had authority to
license brokers and stock exchanges, review registration
statements, and enforce presidential decrees on advertising.
Voucher funds represented the only significant area within the
agency's jurisdiction.' 0 This limited authority meant that
the RFCSE would either have to engage in a bruising battle
with existing bureaucracies to extend its authority or find
niches not already assigned elsewhere. Oversight of trading
associations represented an obvious niche.
The key to successful government involvement was to
permit some oversight and, presumably, enforcement without

Chairman, the Chairman's deputies, the Board, and an Advice Council. The
law provided the Chairman with special powers. Id. § 4.3. The Chairman
was assigned the task of "manag[ing] the current activity of the
Commission" and of assigning duties to deputy directors. Id. The Chairman
also had the authority to sign documents issued by the Commission,
presumably making his or her assent necessary for official action. Id The
Advice Council was to be an advisory board consisting of securities
specialists, including "representatives of state bodies, academic and
educational institutions, [and] commercial structures." Id. § 4.5.
178 I& § 2.0. The RFCSE, however, was given exclusive enforcement
authority. The RFCSE was to "undertake jointly with relevant bodies
official investigations aiming to take decisions on sanctions regarding
participants of the securities market .... " Id. § 3.1.
179 Id.
§ 2.0. In particular, the Commission was given the right "to
organize the audit of the activity of professional participants of the
securities market or to oblige to present audit data." I& § 3.1.
180 Originally, GKI had regulatory authority over voucher funds. With
privatization ending and the purpose for the GKI coming to an end, the
RFCSE was the obvious recipient of that authority. Even here, however,
bureaucratic conflict loomed. Since vouchers would largely expire at the end
of June 1994, voucher funds would have to sell shares for cash in order to
buy shares. In other words, the voucher funds could function as
conventional, closed-end funds. Investment funds, on the other hand, were
subject to the regulatory oversight of the Ministry of Finance.
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creating another large, interventionist bureaucracy. The
creation of a sprawling Russian bureaucracy had already
occurred when the GKI essentially privatized Russian
industry. Given the history of strong central authority in
Russia, comparable development in the area of the securities
regulation also could not be ruled out.
A small bureaucracy, the RFCSE, and a market-driven
mechanism, trading associations, seemed to represent the best
method for bringing order to the Russian securities
markets."' Adopting this approach, however, had certain
negative consequences. As the market continued to develop
and organize, a high level of abuse would naturally occur
which, in the short term, no amount of legal reform could
prevent.
8. CONCLUSION

This Article is designed to accomplish a number of goals.
On one level, it simply conveys a snapshot of the development
of the Russian securities markets, which is a constantly
changing and dynamic process. The same article written a
year from now will no doubt describe a very different stage of
development, particularly as the process of voucher
privatization recedes further and further into the past.8 2
On another level, this Article asserts that legal reform will
not be a successful mechanism for imposing greater order on
the securities markets, at least as long as the efforts remain
divorced from the economic forces behind the market's
behavior.
Legal reform only becomes effective when
participants identify the ways in which the current market
does not adequately protect their interests and when
participants become sufficiently organized and motivated to
alter the existing dynamics.
This simple proposition, however, carries with it some
unappealing baggage.

Legal reform -- whether mandatory

disclosure requirements or more coherent corporate laws -- will

Best, here, connotes the least destructive.
This is not to say that the government's role in disposing of
businesses has ended. Property funds must still sell their residual shares,
which constitutes a considerable portion of the market. In addition,
privatization has proceeded slowly in some areas, particularly in Moscow.
11

182

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss4/1

1994]

RUSSIAN SECURITIES MARKETS

not bring order to the markets. Stepped-up government
enforcement likewise will not significantly change market
behavior but will make the bureaucracy partisan participants
in the existing divisions.
Similarly, abuses and unfair practices are likely to continue
and indeed, are a necessary part of the development of
organized securities markets. The collapse of MMM did more
to educate Russian investors about the need for adequate
information than any government inspired program. By
causing investors to agitate for information changes designed
to better protect their interests, companies will gradually learn
the relationship between disclosure and the capital raising
process."
Only when that occurs will the day of reckoning
mentioned by Vasiliev take place. At that point legal reform
will become far more relevant, primarily as a tool used by
interest groups to effect change in the market.
This suggests that scandals and abuses represent normal
and, indeed, valuable components in the evolutionary process
of the securities markets. They provide an educational
function by illustrating the value of standards that separate
various classes of companies and brokers to ordinary investors.
Without these educational features, no amount of legal reform
or affirmative government policy will eliminate the
undesirable practices.
The danger in Russia is that the presence of scandals and
the failure of legal reform will induce a heavy-handed
governmental response in the name of investor protection. In
the summer of 1994, rumors swirled in the securities markets
that the government was considering a decree that would
prohibit securities trading except through licensed banks;
essentially, this would eliminate brokers as a distinct class of
intermediaries.
Attempts to impose order through government fiat will
work no better than existing legal methods to control the
securities markets. Instead government fiats will hinder the
development of the securities markets. In an effort to
circumvent such governmentally-imposed limitations, the
Overall,
markets will evolve in an inefficient direction.
Indeed, it may well be the case that the organizational efforts by
brokers are, in part, designed to distance themselves from disreputable
segments of the securities markets.
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however, despite all of their disorganization, the Russian
securities markets are moving in the right direction and
should be allowed to continue with the least amount of
interference.
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